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A growing body of theoretical and empirical literature examines inter-firm agreements 
and the role they play in the development of firms’ strategies (Hagerdoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1990, Chesnais, 1988). According to this literature, geographical 
proximity plays a dual role in network formation. On the one hand, it contributes to the 
formation of networks through the establishment of personal contacts and the built-up 
of social capital in local business districts. On the other hand, geographical proximity 
plays a dissuasive role in the formation of networks by erecting barriers to entry and 
inhibiting innovation. This may happen when networks are densely located in some 
closely related business communities. Firms located in distant geographical areas are, 
apparently, more prone to establish network relations. 
 Some researchers (Teece, 1982, Antonelli, 1988) relate the formation of networks 
to the process of innovation and technological change. Externalities and spillover 
effects are important in some industries (high-tech for example) and highly dependent 
on distance. High levels of communication affect the transmission of externalities. 
Geographical proximity is thus a strong necessary condition to take advantage of 
externalities generated by other firms. Networks emerge as a result of efforts to 
internalize selectively the variety of factors necessary to master the process of 
innovation. Regional clustering in industrial districts enhances complementary 
advantages and provides the skills and specialization necessary to achieve higher levels 
of productivity and competitiveness. Intra-regional exchange relations are thus seen as 
a way of strengthening a firm’s market base increasing, thereby, the industry’s 
competitive position internationally. The problem with the externalities approach is 
that it fails to take into account the dynamic nature of networks and does not provide 
any analytical framework explaining the durability of the agreements. 
 Another strand of research emphasizes the presence of transaction costs as a 
factor contributing to the formation of networks. According to this theory, networks 
are seen as long-term agreements located between market transactions and internal 
organization and are set in order to internalize the transaction costs incurred by firms in 
the market place (Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs are minimized especially when 
asset specificity and uncertainty are located at an intermediate level. The problem with 
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the transaction costs approach is that it considers trade-offs between institutional 
arrangements in a static way. It also fails to explain why networks are established even 
when transaction costs are minimal or even not existent. There is a growing theoretical 
and empirical literature (Ciborra, 1990, Zanfei, 1990) arguing that networks are 
becoming an important strategy for acquiring and managing knowledge assets. 
Networks are increasingly seen as primary mechanisms by which firms formalize their 
links to external sources of innovation and the creation of new knowledge assets. An 
increase in knowledge contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage. To the extent that 
competition, technological changes and other environmental factors increase R&D 
costs and risks and shorten products’ life cycles, sharing resources among different 
organizations reduces costs and favors the formation of networks. Networks are thus 
considered to be the outcome of two simultaneous failures; of markets in transferring 
knowledge and of internal organization in accumulating it. 
 Firms use networks as a temporary solution to the problem of acquiring 
knowledge assets. Networks as a “wait-and-see” strategy are very valuable especially 
in uncertain and dynamic information environments. In that way, networks can be 
considered as “options” with real underlying value. In this paper we use the option 
value theory (Arrow and Fisher, 1974) to specify the value of the flexibility of the 
network. We analyze it as an option in an uncertain and dynamic information 
environment. Networks are unstable strategies and as such they do not minimize 
transaction costs. Their value lay therefore in dynamic aspects such as flexibility and 
interactive learning, which further generate a new specific asset. As this new asset is 
gradually appropriated by the partners and it is progressively embedded into their 
routine processes, the collaboration of partners increases and the network becomes 
more integrated and therefore more stable. 
 There are benefits and costs of interactive learning, which depend on the 
“knowledge” distance between the two entities (Lundvall, 1991). I argue that distance 
does not necessarily have a geographical dimension but it is mostly associated with 
culture and distance in knowledge. The more distant (different) firms’ knowledge base 
is, the greater their learning potential. Once the network is set up, interactive learning 
becomes possible through the establishment of procedures, which allow information 
channels to be shared, and codes of information to be exchanged. The process of 
mutual understanding is costly when the knowledge distances are far apart (Llerena 
and Wolff, 1991). 
 My approach, by using the concept of knowledge proximity rather than of 
geographical distance, explains the formation of networks better (both vertical and 
horizontal).  
 Networks are situated some distance apart on the knowledge continuum by 
complementary technologies (i.e., vertical networks) or closer to that continuum with 
similar streams of production process but with different knowledge bases (horizontal 
networks). Case studies from the car and the telecommunications industries serve as 
examples in testing my approach. 
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 The next section examines, in more detail, the arguments for network formation 
and reviews the literature. I then present the analytical framework and the testable 
hypothesis of my model. To validate the thesis, I examine the reasons for establishing 
networks in the car and telecommunications industries. It appears that the networks are 
the preferred strategy when the degree of sunkness of costs (risk) is high. The net 
benefits are maximized when firms “buy” the option of “wait-and-see” strategy. 
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Networks, Agreements and Transaction Costs 
 
Flexibility is a market characteristic, the cornerstone of any market mechanism. 
Economists argue that flexibility, through price and quantity adjustments, inherent in 
unfettered (not regulated) market structures ensures an optimal allocation of resources 
(Pareto optimality). Networks, as opposed to integration are more flexible 
organizational structures than hierarchies (integration). 
 If integration and other centralized strategies reduce flexibility why do firms 
decide to go ahead with this strategy? Williamson (1975, 1989) argued that firms use 
hierarchies instead of markets because of the existence of transaction costs. The latter 
are loosely defined to include any costs associated with the use of markets instead of 
hierarchies. Transaction costs are exacerbated because economic agents act 
opportunistically, especially in environments characterized by asymmetric information 
and uncertainties. If we add to this bounded rationality, i.e., the natural limitations in 
the cognitive abilities of economic agents to resolve complex situations, and asset 
specificity, economic agents would incur substantial costs to make contracts between 
parties that try to take into account every possible outcome. This ex ante  limitation in 
writing perfect contracts and the costs associated with ex post complying, monitoring 
and enforcing the contract’s contingent clauses provides firms with sound incentives to 
use hierarchies instead of market transactions. 
 Asset specificity and uncertainty play a significant role in explaining a firm’s 
decision to use hierarchies. Asset specificity arises from the specialization of a 
valuable resource. The higher the specificity of an asset, the lower its ability to find 
alternative uses without sacrificing valuable productive capacity. Investments in 
specific assets with limited alternative uses are considered to have high sunk costs, 
which give rise to a small number environment with possibilities of strategic 
bargaining and opportunistic behavior. Asset specificity can take various forms such as 
geographic specificity, physical asset specificity, and human resources specificity. 
 Uncertainty arises from changing market and technology conditions. The recent 
radical technological changes greatly transformed many markets. The institutional 
changes (deregulation, globalization, internationalization and atomization of 
production) that have followed the technological innovations increased transaction 
costs and with them the specificity (the sunkness) of assets used in the production 
process. In these cases, transaction costs would make the use of hierarchies more cost 
efficient than market transactions. 
 In the past decade or so the use of hierarchies did not preclude the use of other 
strategies like networks. Firms use multiple strategies at the same time. For example, 
the telecommunications, computers and computer programming, biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical and the car industries, to name a few, have been dramatically 
transformed lately through consolidations and outright purchases of rival firms (Niosi, 
2001). At the same time these industries have created many networks. Transaction 
costs theory has difficulties in explaining the simultaneous adoption of these strategies. 
According to the transaction costs theory, hierarchies (integration) should be the 
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outcome whenever changes in asset specificity result in an increase in the transaction 
costs. It can then be argued that the transaction costs approach does not fully capture 
the dynamic features of technology and the formation of networks. I demonstrate, later 
in the chapter, that option theory gives a more reasonable explanation for the formation 
of networks. 
 To substantiate the main argument of transaction costs theory, Llerena et al. 
(1991) used a diagram (Figure 3.1) to show the links among asset specificity, 
transaction costs and the various forms of organizational structure. Networks are 
situated between markets and hie rarchies and correspond to an intermediate level of 
asset specificity. The governance structure that emerges is the one that minimizes 
transactions costs. But when asset specificity is too high (such as in the 
telecommunications and the car industries), transaction costs theory is inadequate to 
explain the formation of networks. 
 It is my proposition that transaction costs are important but they are not the only 
factors considered by firms in their integration or network decisions. Other factors such 
as flexibility and the benefits arising out of it can be predominant factors. It can be the 
case that firms decide to use both strategies at the same time. If, for example, 
uncertainty is low, the benefits from using the market are much higher than for other 
strategies. At intermediary levels of uncertainty, integration is the more advantageous 
strategy, while when uncertainty is at a high level, networks provide a better choice. 
There is then a relationship between uncertainty (as measured by the amount of sunk 
costs) and net benefits of each alternative strategy. The benefits from networks are 
valuable because they offer flexibility and interactive learning and contribute to the 
creation of knowledge (vertical and/or horizontal). Networks can thus be analyzed as a 
means of increasing flexibility. The nature of flexibility considered is a key to our 
analysis. Flexibility refers to the adaptation capability of the firm and its learning 
ability. Its adaptation capability protects itself from external shocks while its learning 
ability enables the network to create resources through a collective learning process 
(Favereau, 1989, Aoki, 1988).  
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Figure 3.1  Asset Specificity and Choice of Organizational Forms  
 
 
Networks and Adaptability 
 
Clusters and networks are becoming essential in the present context of globalization. 
Networks are not simply geographic concentrations of companies. It is a cooperation 
and interaction of learning through combinations of different kind of knowledge 
emanating from suppliers, customers, manufacturers of complementary products, 
government and other institutions such as universities, standards agencies and 
vocational training providers. Networks’ growth is a self-reinforcing cycle. As a single 
firm’s success brings other suppliers or inspires cooperation with other companies or 
institutions, other companies that can benefit from those resources are drawn closer to 
the network. Clustering and networking offer companies a favorable business 
environment that enables firms to get a competitive advantage they could not acquire 
in isolation (Porter, 1998, p. 78). 
 The value of networks lies on their ability to create new specific assets. They are 
conducive to resource creation and innovation through information efficiency 
generated by cooperation among member firms. The creation of new specific resources 
increases the core competencies of member firms, their competitiveness and their 
profitability. Greater knowledge means a greater degree of adaptability and greater 
capacity to deal with changing economic and business environments. The degree of 
appropriation of the new knowledge determines the viability and the duration of the 
network. If spillover effects are low and the appropriation high then agreements tend to 
be more stable. Learning through interaction and confrontation increases the 
possibilities for combining diverse experiences and different kinds of knowledge. Such 
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a way of learning brings more innovative approaches to resolve problems related to the 
management and innovation (R&D) within and among firms. 
 This interactive learning and the creation of new resources are not without costs. 
At the beginning of the formation of networks costs are particularly high. But as 
member firms learn from each other and share their newly created information, 
establish a common language of communication and reduce their cultural differences, 
the costs become less important. Once the initial stages of collaboration are set out and 
cooperation is smoothed out, the interactive learning process begins to bring about the 
benefits of collaboration. Complementarities in knowledge among member firms are 
more important in the interactive learning process rather than common knowledge 
already shared by firms. Accordingly, the benefits of interactive learning increase with 
greater knowledge distances of member firms. Lundvall (1991) examined the 
interactive learning in networks and illustrated graphically (Figure 3.2) the potential 
benefits and costs derived from knowledge distances among member firms. Obviously, 
the net benefits are maximized when these distances are at an intermediate (d*) level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Benefits and Costs of Learning 
 
 The creation of new specific assets which are gradually incorporated into the 
networks become routine operations which contribute, in their turn, to the stability of 
the agreements. Networks become more stable as their capability to appropriate the 
creation of new specific assets is greater. The new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) play a pivotal role in shaping the appropriation of new specific 
assets. Broadband (high-speed data) and other ICT services have the ability to erase 
Distance in 
knowledge 
Potential benefits 
from learning 
Learning costs  Costs and 
benefits of 
learning 
Net learning 
benefits 
d* (optimal) 
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distances that have often been considered obstacles to the appropriation of spillovers 
and the establishment of networks. With ICT’s help, many smaller communities and 
non-urban localities can now become part of a network and enjoy the benefits that used 
to be the sole province of concentrated activities around certain urban poles. New ICT 
infrastructure is within the reach of many far distant localities, giving distant firms the 
same digital opportunities as their urban counterparts. The building of wireless 
networks, the installation of coaxial cables, or the deployment of copper-based DSL 
lines and the decision of many high-tech companies to upgrade their own infrastructure 
and the expansion of the portfolio of services brings greater possibilities of network 
formation regardless of geographical distances1. 
 Uncertainties arising from technological diversification, market segmentation, 
changing economic and business environment and information asymmetries are 
increasing. Network-building strategies are flexible business decisions. They allow 
firms to wait until they accumulate more experience and information before choosing a 
definite organizational form. Networks are temporary strategies that give firms more 
time to cope with uncertainty and complexity of information (an intermediate solution 
between markets and hierarchies). In that sense networks is an “option” with a great 
underlying value. Viewed as such, the option theory can be used to analyze the 
formation of networks. The next section presents the option model. 
 
 
Theoretical Elements of the Formation of Networks: The Option Theory 
Model 
 
Option theory is concerned with the optimal timing of a strategic decision or when to 
exercise a strategic decision. The option of optimally acting in the future should be of 
value today. By undertaking a risky project (j) that is costly and difficult to reverse 
(sunk investment), the firm incurs costs and “kills” the option of investing if and when 
conditions are more favorable in the future. If the firm invests today, it would want the 
present value of expected benefits to equal or exceed the present value of expected 
costs plus the value of the option to wait. I argue that networks provide member firms 
the option to wait and see and act later when the firm has more information and 
knowledge especially in a complex and ever-changing dynamic environment where 
complexities and opportunistic behavior are more prevalent. 
 I begin with a simple two-period model to get a feel for these two important 
aspects of network building capacity. Consider a firm with the following project. 
Develop a new technology either internally (i.e., an integrated solution (i)) or through 
building a network (i.e., an agreement (a)). The outcome of this strategy is uncertain. 
The project (j) has (p) probability of success and (1-p) of failure. 
 Using the network entails more transaction costs than using the integrated 
approach. On static terms, the integrated approach will be favored instead of the 
establishment of networks. Nevertheless, the strategy to establish networks would be 
preferred over alternative strategies should we consider that the latter increases a firm’s 
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specter of choices in the future and allows it to get more timely information and 
elaborate more sound strategies. Because of the existence of an “option value” in the 
networks strategy, the latter would be preferred over alternative strategies. The 
network building process is more like a “buying time” strategy that allows firms to 
wait and see how the situation evolves before taking a more definite approach. 
 The value attached to this option strategy can be high enough to compensate for 
the higher transaction costs of network building (ca > ci), especially in a world 
characterized by ever-increasing information complexities. Flexibility is, however, 
synonymous to instability and the network building strategy is inherently unstable. 
Networks could become more stable when adaptation and learning are explicitly 
included into this framework. Suppose a firm decides to use the integrated approach 
and that the technology development provides T0 revenues today and D1 in the future. 
The present value of the firm choosing the integrated approach is  
 
D = T0 + rD1 where r = 1/(1+d) is the discount factor.  (3.1) 
 
 If the firm decides to use the “decisional flexibility” approach i.e., the strategy of 
building a network, its current value would be A0. In the future, both this decision (A) 
and the revenues of the firm are uncertain. Suppose that there are two possibilities 
 
· a positive state of nature (s=1) during which the network building is a success 
and the new technology is introduced 
· a less positive state of nature (s=2) during which the network building is a 
failure and the technology is not introduced 
 
 In the first case, the net revenue T1,1 is greater than the firm’s current value A1,1. In 
the second case (s=2) the net revenue T1,2 is less than the value of the firm A1,2. Thus, 
in the future state 1 T1,1 > A 1,1, and in future state 2, A1,2 > T1,2. 
 Suppose we attach probabilities to these two strategies, p with state 1 (s=1) and 
(1-p) with state 2 (s=2), assuming that T0 > A0 > 0. If the integrated approach is not 
consummated today, it is optimal to use the integration strategy if state 1 occurs. By 
contrast, the network building strategy is more optimal if state 2 occurs. With this 
optimal, state-contingent decision rule, the expected present value of building a 
network is given by 
 
P = A0+ r[pT1,1 + (1-p) A1,2]     (3.2) 
 
 It is obvious from this equation that integration is a preferred strategy if D>P, 
while the network-building approach becomes more attractive if D<P because it gives 
the option to wait and see and adopt the most advantageous strategy depending on the 
prevailing state of nature in the time. 
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The point of indifference, where D = P, implies that  
 
T0 + rD1 - A0 = r[p T1,1 + (1-p)A1,2]    (3.3) 
 
 The left hand side of the equation represents the net value of adopting the 
integrated approach today while the option value in t = 0 has been deducted from T0 + 
rD1. On the right hand side the term r[pT1,1 + (1-p)A1,2] is the option value of not 
adopting the integrated approach today (t = 0). If the firm adopts the networking–
building approach today instead of the integrated approach, it preserves the option of 
behaving optimally in the future (integrate in state 1 and use the network-building 
strategy in state 2). Option value in this case is the discounted expected net value of 
behaving optimally in the future. Option value is unambiguously positive with positive 
values for T1,1 and A1,2 and 1> r >0, 1 > p >0. The above results are presented in Table 
3.1. 
It is interesting making a comparative static analysis by examining the impact 
of changing certain values on the incentives to preserve the option of acting more 
freely in the future. First, an increase in T1,1 or A1,2 will increase option value and it 
will tend to increase the incentive to build a network instead of favoring the integration 
approach. In contrast, an increase in T0, D1 or a decrease in A0 will increase the net 
value of integration (left hand side) and tend to increase the likelihood of the integrated 
approach. Finally, an increase in the discount rate d, will reduce the option value of 
network formation (right hand side) more than it reduces the left hand side, thus 
integration becomes a more preferable solution than building a network today. Table 
3.2 summarizes the comparative static results of alternative business strategies. 
 
Table 3.1  Comparing Costs and Benefits of Various Business Strategies 
 
Strategies Transaction 
costs 
Option 
value 
Firm’s present value Decision rule 
 
Network 
 
High 
 
high 
 
P = A0+ r[p T1,1  + (1-p) A1,2] 
 
If D<P 
Adopt the network 
strategy  
 
Integration 
 
Low 
 
low 
 
P = positive 
 
If D>P 
Adopt the 
integration  
strategy  
 
 It is interesting enough to examine a relationship not so obvious a priori 
concerning the sign of dp/dd and the optimal option offered to the firm of being 
indifferent between the integrated approach and the network building strategy. 
Multiplying both sides of the last equation by (1+d) we get the following equation 
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(T0 - A0) dd = (T1,1 - A1,2) dp,  or    (3.4) 
 
dp/dd = (T0 - A0)/(T1,1 - A1,2)     (3.5) 
 
The latter takes into account the changes in p which must counter an increase in d in 
order to preserve the indifference. I have assumed that T0 > A0. If T1,1 > A1,2, it will be 
the case that dp/dd >0,  On the contrary, if A1,2 >T1,1, then dp/dd < 0. Such an outcome 
is perfectly justified since an increase in the discount rate reduces option value and we 
would need to increase the probability of the higher-valued future state in order to 
maintain indifference. If T1,1 > A1,2, then p must go up, whereas if A1,2 >T1,1, p must go 
down in order for (1-p) to go up. 
  
Table 3.2  Comparative Statics of Various Business Strategies 
 
Factors Value of the strategy Decision rule 
 
If T1,1­ or if 
A1,2­ 
 
­ the network option value  
 
­ network formation 
 
If T0, D1 ­ or A0 
¯ 
 
­net value of integration today 
 
­integration adoption strategy  
 
If d ­ 
 
¯option value of network formation 
 
Integration today (killing the 
option) 
 
 Although the value of both strategies is quite high today, it is the network strategy 
that brings more value in the future because of the option it provides to the firm to act 
later when it possesses more information. This is illustrated graphically (Figure 3.3). 
 Firms value the short and long term costs and benefits before they adopt a specific 
strategy. The present value of both integration and network building strategies is quite 
high but unequal. The integration strategy has a higher value today than the network 
strategy but its option value is quite low. In contrast, the network strategy has a lower 
value today but combined with its much higher option value, it has a total present value 
much higher than the integration strategy because of the flexibility it provides2. Firms 
will use the network strategy whenever uncertainty and other business factors are 
unstable. The analysis of the establishment of networks in the telecommunications and 
the car industries provides a heuristic proof of our arguments. Next section deals with 
this. 
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Figure 3.3  Comparing the Value of Network-building and Integration Strategies 
 
 
Networks and Risk in the Car and Telecommunications Industries 
 
To illustrate our argument we take as an example the car and telecommunications 
industries. The first one is a more traditional industry although knowledge-intensive 
one, especially now with the integration of many new technologies in building and 
running the cars. Although cars seem to be standardized products their components are 
not. They are comple tely different from what they were in the past and they depend on 
a great number of new technologies and knowledge inputs. As Loasby (1998) has 
argued, firms are becoming increasingly multi-technology in their production 
processes. They are increasingly relying on a growing range of networks to get access 
to external capabilities. 
 The telecommunications industry has always been viewed as highly dynamic, 
especially after it has been deregulated and converged with information and media 
industries. It has a high-tech component and it is knowledge-intensive. Both car and 
telecommunication industries face major technological breakthroughs and a change in 
their competitive environment. Both have become more global and face market 
segmentation (micro-market phenomenon). Their degree of asset specificity and 
uncertainty is quite high, leading one to argue that transaction costs are potentially 
important to explain their integration strategies. It is true that both industries have used 
integration in the past few years, but the number of alliances and knowledge networks 
they have created has increased dramatically as well. The option theory can better 
explain this strategy. 
Network’s option value (n) 
Present value 
of network 
strategy (n) 
Present value 
of the 
integration 
strategy (i) 
Time 
Firm’s value 
Option value of the 
integration strategy (i) 
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 In the past decade or so, car and telecommunications industries began forming 
alliances and networks beyond their national boundaries with the goals of rationalizing 
production through joint research, development, design, production, and engineering, 
component sharing and enhancing competitive positions in the markets. Ballard Power 
Systems, a Canadian firm with its new fuel-cell technology, has entered into 
agreements with all major car producers in Canada, the United States, Europe and 
Asia. The networks were established because of the knowledge proximity rather than 
the geographical distance of the partners. Geographical distance among partners was 
not an important factor in the creation of these networks. Rather the goal to increase 
their competitive edge through tapping into localized sources of specialized expertise 
(gaining a location advantage), complementary technologies and the knowledge 
proximity were the main incentives to form the networks. 
 Indeed, the car industry is a truly global one. It uses geographical spread in order 
to achieve technological diversification by using agreements and/or outright purchases 
of rival firms. This strategy gives firms a competitive edge and allows them to get into 
markets and territories entirely out of reach only few years ago. These strategies reduce 
uncertainties and risks and provide incentives to increase investment and innovations. 
There are a number of factors that make the car industry business environment more 
complex and risky. For example, there are tougher environmental regulations3 
worldwide, chiefly in California 4 that obliges car manufacturers to reduce the gases 
from emissions. Pollution cannot be reduced to predetermined levels without the use of 
new, more efficient technologies. 
 Ballard Power Systems is the inventor of the Ballard fuel cell, a proprietary zero-
emission engine that combines hydrogen (which can be obtained from natural gas, 
methanol, petroleum or renewable sources) and oxygen (from air) to generate 
electricity without combustion. It is a promising technology that could revolutionize 
the world if it becomes economically viable . It could supplant existing technologies but 
as yet it is simply an interesting and promising technology. There are a multitude of 
similar technologies (e.g., Fuelcell Energy Inc., Global Thermoeletric Inc., Plug 
Power, Active power, Capstone Turbine Corporation), but at the moment, none of 
them has managed to establish itself as the standard of the industry. Car manufacturers 
could use this technology to make their cars cleaner and environmentally friendly. But 
there are many unknown factors. First of all, the new rules of the game are not clear 
yet. Environmental regulation differs from country to country and the introduction of 
clean cars is at the far bottom of the agenda of many countries especially the less 
developed ones. Carmakers have worried that investments made before these more 
stringent environmental regulations might become “stranded assets” and they are 
reluctant to go ahead with more investments if regulations are not clear. 
 The uncertainty arising from cleaner technologies and government regulations is 
compounded by a new market trend, which also affects the telecommunications 
industry. Carmakers have to face a micro-market phenomenon. They must provide a 
range of “quasi-customized” goods and services. Acquiring knowledge of market and 
demand changes is costly as market research is done for ever-thinner segments of the 
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market. As a result, relative R&D costs increase and car manufacturers have to acquire 
a deep knowledge of their clients’ future needs in order to integrate them early in the 
innovation process. 
 It is clear that, in the car industry, the degree of environmental uncertainty and the 
risks associated with the internal dynamics of technical progress are quite high5. 
According to my argument, the car industry can mitigate some of these uncertainties, 
especially the ones arising from market segmentation and changing customer 
preferences by acquiring competitors. Horizontal consolidation allows the industry to 
get the knowledge and know-how it needs in order to reduce marketing and production 
costs arising from market uncertainties. The desire to acquire horizontal knowledge 
favors consolidation as the recent examples from the car industry demonstrate 
(Daimler Benz buying Chrysler, Renault buying Nissan, etc.). Thus the acquisition of 
core competencies and strategic assets has many justifications, but transaction costs are 
an important motive. The formation of networks is a more appropriate strategy, 
however, should companies desire to acquire vertical (upstream/downstream) 
knowledge.  Given that environmentally friendly technologies are quite new and not 
standardized yet, the wait-and-see strategy, as it was explained above, is the least 
expensive one and the most valuable. Thus, General Motors, Ford Motors, 
DaimlerChrysler, Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen, ALSTHOM and other major carmakers 
have created networks with the main provider of the clean environment technology, the 
Canadian firm, Ballard Power Systems. 
 By choosing major players in every continent, Ballard tries to get extensive 
expertise in engineering, management solutions and design of its fuel cell engine. 
Since it is a late R&D company there are many roadblocks to successful 
implementation of proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells. There are costs 
challenges, competition and the uncertainty of the technology.  Fuel cells are expensive 
to manufacture and economies of scale have not yet been mastered. The problem of 
competing technologies amplifies the uncertainties in this area. The primary rivals to 
fuel cells are hybrid engines – internal combustion plus an electric motor – and battery-
powered cars. Next there is the problem of building a whole network of fueling 
stations. Putting into place an infrastructure for the entire country is a daunting task. 
But given that Ballard has a superior fuel cell why would car companies do their own?  
It is more advantageous to them to establish networks with Ballard and develop 
together this new technology. It is the least expensive and more profitable strategy for 
the car industry. 
 The same story can be said for the telecommunications industry. In the past 
decade or so, Bell Canada and other major telecommunication firms have made a 
number of agreements and established networks with other telephone firms and 
equipment manufacturers worldwide. When uncertainty is at an intermediate level, 
upstream and downstream knowledge is acquired by mergers and acquisitions. When 
uncertainty (as measured by the degree of sunkness of costs) is high, a networks 
strategy is used to acquire vertical knowledge. 
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 After a decade of drastic regulatory and technological changes the 
telecommunications industry is still under the shock of convergence. New technologies 
and new services are continuously introduced while prices are dropping drastically 
making these services accessible to a great number of users. Like the car industry, the 
telecommunications industry faces a customization of its demand. New services or 
packages of services are offered in a variety of forms in order to satisfy the particular 
needs of almost every group of customers. Acquiring the necessary knowledge for 
evaluating the needs of its customers increases market research costs and relative R&D 
costs. Information, communications and the media (print and electronic) industries 
converge as new broadband, IP and DSL technologies expand the capacity of the 
network and transmission costs are reduced. 
 Regulatory risk is less important to the telecommunications industry than to the 
car industry. Telecommunications have been deregulated and the new regulatory rules 
are clear and well known to the parties concerned6. The uncertainties arise from 
technological changes and the absence of technological standards in the mobile and 
cellular telephony. Furthermore, it is not clear yet whether the new technologies will 
really allow various industries with such diverse line of services like basic telephony, 
data, multimedia (image, sound, etc.), Internet, television, PCS, print and electronic 
news, 3G technology, etc., to converge. 
 As may be expected, the telecommunications industry uses both integration and 
networks strategies at the same time. When uncertainties are at an intermediate level 
downstream or upstream knowledge is acquired by outright acquisition of suppliers 
and/or customers. At low uncertainty levels the benefits of using the market are much 
higher than the benefits of other strategies. Lastly, when the uncertainty is quite high, 
the network formation strategy is much more beneficial than the other strategies as 
illustrated in the graph below (Figure 3.4). The higher the uncertainty the higher the 
option value attached to the network formation strategy. 
 To illustrate my argument, (i.e., when risk is high network formation is the 
appropriate strategy), I report some historical statistical evidence from the 
telecommunications industry. When modern digital switches were introduced with 
storage-controlled programs, switch development changed from a hardware- to a 
software–based project. The development of a modern switch is a very lengthy process 
with high fixed (sunk) costs, switch software accounts for about 75% of its total cost 
(which in 1990 figures was about $1.5 billion). The next generation switches (optical 
switches designed to respond to the increased use of fiber optics or digital switches 
designed to handle broadband transmissions) are even more expensive to develop ($2 
billion per switch). The risks arising from the introduction of these new technologies 
are quite high especially when markets are competitive and the costs are rising. To 
reduce risk, major telecommunication carriers forged network agreements. Their goal 
was to reduce the number of models from twelve to three or five switches. Table 3.3 
lists some of the networks for this technology. 
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Figure 3.4  Benefits and Cost of Alternative Strategies 
 
 The same argument holds with the personal communications networks (PCN). In 
the 1990s the exact form of PCN technology was not clear. The cost of developing 
each of the three networks was estimated to be in the range of $1 billion to $2 billion 
each. Table 3.5 lists the three groups of companies that have established networks for 
developing these new technologies.  
 The striking characteristic of these networks is that they are international in 
nature. They are set regardless of geographical distances. What matters is the 
knowledge distances among the partners and the interaction of learning and the 
capacity of the new entity to create new resources. 
 
Table 3.3  Networks in Central Office Switches 
 
Companies Country Year 
CGE (Alcatel) and ITT France 1987 
Ericsson and CGT France 1987 
AT&T and Philips Netherlands 1986 
AT&T and Italatel Italy 1989 
AT&T and GTE United States 1989 
Siemens and EC-Plessy (GTP) United Kingdom 1989 
Source: Hausman, (1991) 
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Conclusions 
 
Networks and clusters have traditionally been thought of as being agreements among 
firms in specific localized geographic areas (e.g., biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
in Montreal, or biotechnology and computer technologies in Texas, Massachusetts, 
California). Transaction costs theory has been advanced as one of the most prominent 
candidates in explaining their formation. In an ever-changing environment with great 
uncertainties arising from globalization, deregulation and above all technological 
changes and innovations, the use of markets entails substantial transaction costs. The 
latter are compounded by limited rationality, asset specificity and asymmetric 
information (the free-riding problem). Contracts are necessarily incomplete and their 
enforcement and monitoring is quite costly. The use of in-house approaches, such as 
integration, is a strategy, which allows firms to reduce transaction costs. 
The transactions costs theory being static in nature fails to account for the ever-
increasing use of agreements (networks, clusters, etc.,) among firms. It is argued in this 
paper that networks can be viewed as a wait-and-see strategy, which allow firms to get 
more information and knowledge and act accordingly in the future. Networks have an 
intrinsic value, which lies in the option offered to firms to have the choice to decide in 
the future. As an option, networks can be evaluated using the traditional finance and 
environmental option theory. 
Table 3.4  Networks in Personal Communications Technologies in the UK 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
BAE (UK) Gable & Wireless 
(UK) 
STC (UK) 
Pacific 
Telesis(USA) 
Motorola (US) Thorn-EMI (UK) 
Matra (France) Telefonica (Spain) US WEST (USA) 
Millecom (UK & 
US) 
 Deutsche Bundesposts 
(Germany) 
Sony (Japan)   
Source: Hausman, (1991) 
 
 It is undeniable that integration may fetch certain advantages that cannot be 
realized by the use of networks. There may be first-mover advantages and integration 
may be the most appropriate strategy to get them. I argue that hierarchies are used in 
order to get core competencies and strategic assets immediately. This may be dictated 
by the degree of openness of the market, the change in policies of a country or a major 
technological breakthrough. Firms may proceed to horizontal (competitors markets) or 
vertical (highly complementary products or services) relations in order to reduce risk 
and uncertainties resulted from major changes (institutional, regulatory, competitive, 
political, etc.,), which dramatically affected the business environment. 
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 There may be second-mover advantages, especially when the uncertainties arise 
from the introduction of new and expensive technologies and there is no standard in 
the industry. The risks are high and the business environment very uncertain. 
Integration can be a costly strategy. In such circumstances network formation and 
clusters have a value because they allow firms to elaborate clearer strategies in the 
future. This may be the case when products, services, or technologies of some firms are 
potentially related but at the current stage of knowledge and technological advances 
the outcomes are unclear. It is therefore more advantageous to adopt the wait-and-see 
approach. Option theory is a more robust one, capable of explaining networks and 
clusters in a dynamic environment. 
 The car and telecommunications industries have been used as a case study to 
illustrate these arguments. In effect, both industries work in a business environment, 
which is characterized by rapid technological changes and micro-segmentation of their 
market demand. Costs in developing new products or new techniques of production are 
quite onerous. Yet, there is no agreement as far as the technological standards are 
concerned. There are many competing technologies to be used for cleaner cars and 
there are many technologies (none of them quite well established) in the 
telecommunications (including cellular, PCS, 3G, etc.). Given that the business 
environment is quite uncertain and risky, networks provide a sound alternative to 
integration7. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Obviously, not all firms use the latest ICT services. In countries of digital “haves and have 
nots” the traditional reasons for network creation are still valid. The digital divide is a 
reality and the currently available technologies are not well suited to serving small 
numbers of customers spread over a wide area. Even in the USA, broadband reaches only 
20% of zip codes in less urban areas (it is 57% in urban areas). 
2 As with any other option, the network strategy will get a zero value in the future if the 
firm waits to long before acting (exercising it). But such an outcome is consistent with the 
option theory. It is not because your house did not pass on fire that your insurance is 
worthless. 
3 The Kyoto accord specifies that 37 industrialized countries mu st reduce, by year 2012, 
their pollution emissions (greenhouse gases) by 6 per cent from 1990 levels (Gentzoglanis, 
A., 2000). 
4 By 2003 some 6% of all new vehicles sold in California have to be so-called “partial 
emission” cars, while 4% must be zero-emission standards. California has the strictest 
environmental regulations because it has the worst air pollution problems. 
5 Although Ballard has not turned a profit –  after 17 years of developing its fuel cell – and it 
is not expected to reach profitability until the middle of the decade, the company’s future 
could potentially be huge. 
6 There are still uncertainties concerning competition at the local level and in the new 
services (Internet, cellular, etc). 
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7 This is not to say that firms could use exclusively the network strategy. Integration may be 
used simultaneously especially when the firm wants to acquire rapidly core competencies 
or strategic assets, as we mentioned above. 
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